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ABSTRACT 
The potential for achieving sustainable and efficient harvesting of three species of migratory tuna in the 
Western and Central Pacific Ocean is examined. The stocks reside in exclusive economic zones (mainly 
those of Pacific island countries) and in the high seas. Most harvesting is carried out by distant water 
fishing  nations,  including  the  USA,  Japan,  Taiwan,  China  and  Korea.  Problems  of  achieving 
sustainability and efficiency in the harvesting of the stocks by disparate countries are made more difficult 
due to changes in the harvesting levels of one fleet affecting the rents of another fleet through changes in 
the age distribution of stock. These types of problem are under review by the Western and Central Pacific 
Fisheries Commission. Results from an age-structured steady-state bioeconomic model are used to show: 
the changes in fleet rents and catches of tuna if all fleets form a cooperative grand coalition to deploy 
fishing effort to maximize rents over the region; the likely non-stability of the grand coalition; and the 
inferior Nash Equilibria outcomes if fleets fish non-cooperatively to maximize their own rents. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The tuna fishery in the Western and Central Pacific is the world’s largest, supplying about half of the 
world’s tuna supplies [1]. It is conducted by fleets from many distant water and Pacific island nations. 
Traditionally fishing in this area was mainly by the Japanese, using longline or pole and line gear. Over 
time additional nations adopted longlining in the area, especially Taiwan and Korea. Furthermore, from 
the 1970s on, purse seine fishing increased rapidly. Purse seining is carried out by a variety of nations: the 
United States, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Pacific island nations, in addition to those involved in 
longlining. The Pacific island nations also do some longlining. 
 
In 2004 the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) was established following the 
United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA) of 1995 to overcome the problems which arise in 
fisheries straddling exclusive zones and the high seas. The Commission oversees the implementation of 
the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western 
and Central Pacific Ocean. The convention advocates measures to ensure long-term sustainability of fish 
stocks in the Convention Area and their optimum utilisation. A current area of concern arises from the 
Commission’s Scientific Committee noting that biological overfishing of bigeye and yellowfin is now 
likely to be occurring [2]. 
 
An additional aspect of the possible economic overexploitation of the tuna stocks in the Western and 
Central Pacific is the effect of purse seining tuna catches on the longline catches. Purse seining is carried 
out primarily for skipjack tuna, but some yellowfin and bigeye tuna also get entangled in the seines. The 
bycatches of yellowfin and bigeye tuna have a detrimental effect on the longline catches because the IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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purse seiners primarily take young tuna which would otherwise have increased in unit weight and become 
available to the longline fleets, fetching higher prices. The question therefore arises whether reducing the 
purse seine catch or otherwise reducing the bycatches of bigeye and yellowfin would be advisable. Do 
these fish represent a higher value if left for the longline fleets, or is it economically advantageous to 
allow them to be taken by the purse seine fleets? 
 
In this paper we shall look at the interaction between the purse seine fleets and the longline fleets. Would 
it make sense, from an overall point of view, to reduce the former for the benefit of the latter? This is a 
part of the larger issue of what rate and pattern of exploitation would maximize the combined economic 
rents of the fleets: which fleets should participate in the fisheries and on what scales? Given that such a 
solution would most likely entail some fleets fishing less than presently or not at all, could such a solution 
be implemented by some kind of rent sharing? And if not, or if a rent-maximizing solution is unlikely to 
be implemented for other reasons, what kind of outcome can we expect when all national fleets compete 
against each other? These are the types of questions being raised recently by the WCPFC (see [3]). The 
Commission views the consensus-based setting of a total allowable catch (TAC), with national and high 
seas allocations, as the most effective long-term option for conservation and management of the fish 
stocks. We compare nations’ recent catches with those estimated to return maximum total rents on a long-
term  sustainable  basis.  The  potential  for  these  catches  to  be  accepted  as  quotas  and  adopted  by  a 
consensus of participating nations is examined. 
 
We shall consider three stocks that are likely to be, to a greater or lesser degree, mixed in the fishing areas 
and hence jointly caught by the fishing fleets. These are bigeye, yellowfin and skipjack. All three are 
found mainly in the tropical areas between 10 degrees north and south of the equator. Albacore tuna, also 
fished in the Western and Central Pacific, is mainly found further away from the equator and therefore 
less likely to be included in the joint catches of the other three species. 
 
The question of maximizing rents in the Western and Central Pacific tuna fishery has been analysed 
before. Bertignac et al. [4] used a detailed age-structured model with a number of different fleets to look 
into the effects of changing the size of different fleets. They calculated the rent gains versus losses from 
changing fishing effort for the different fleets and the interaction between different fleets for the different 
stocks involved. Kompas and Che [5] used a disaggregated, stochastic bioeconomic model to find optimal 
effort for the three stocks considered in this paper. The emphasis here is somewhat different; we look not 
just  at  the  rent-maximizing  solution,  but  also  at  whether,  under  ideal  circumstances,  a  grand  rent-
maximizing coalition is likely to be stable, and what would be the outcome of competition among the 
fleets of the various nations participating in the fishery. For this reason we employ a simpler model of the 
tuna stocks than the one used by Bertignac et al. [4]. When possible, data from the disaggregated model 
are used in the much simpler and highly aggregated model, but some of the model changes lead to 
requirements for different parameter estimates. The way in which some parameters were tuned to obtain 
good model fits between modelled and actual catches is described below. 
 
THE MODEL 
 
The model employed is a yield-per-recruit model. Each age interval is one quarter year. Growth, natural 
mortality, availability, and gear selectivity parameters were taken from the WCPOBTM-model [6]. 
 
Since the 1990s most of the skipjack has been taken by purse seiners. This is true to a lesser extent for 
yellowfin,  of  which  substantial  catches  are  taken  by  longlines.  Most  of  the bigeye  is  also  taken  by 
longliners,  but  there  is  a  non-negligible  catch  by  purse  seiners  which  rose  sharply  in  1997  due  to 
increased use of fish aggregating devices and has stayed high since, albeit with fluctuations. The use of 
pole and line gear is in decline.  
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For modelling purposes, a steady state age-structured stock system is simulated as follows. Stock in each 
age category is reduced over each quarterly fishing season by natural mortality, which is exogenously 
determined, and fishing mortality, which is determined by the harvesting efforts of K = 14 fleets. Stock in 
the first age category is replenished in each quarter at a constant rate of recruitment. This is a convenient 
abstraction from biological models that treat recruitment as a function of adult stock biomass. As numbers 
decline in older age categories, the effect on biomass is to some degree offset by the increasing weight of 
individual fish. 
 
For each stock species s, the population  , i s x  in each quarterly age category i from 1 to s I  is: 
 
 
, ,
, ,
1, ,
, 1,
, 1, ,
                 2,..., 1;  1,2,3
( )
i s i s
i s i s
s r s
f m
i s i s s
f m
I s I s I s
x x
x x e i I s
x x x e
− −
−
− −
−
=
= = − =
= +
  (1) 
 
where  , r s x  is recruitment numbers into the first age category,  , i s m  is the quarterly instantaneous rate of 
natural mortality, and
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Catch for species s accumulates from each age category over the season as a function of the standing 
biomass, which in turn depends on natural and fishing mortality, and individual growth, as follows: 
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where  , i s w  is the average unit catch weight of fish in the i-th age category. 
The model is not dynamic in that the decision variables Ek remain the same for all quarterly time periods. 
However,  this  enables  the  impact  of  changes  in  Ek  on  steady  state  stocks,  catches  and  rents  to  be 
determined. 
 
The effort vector  k E , to be used as a reference solution, is meant to reflect the recent status of the fleets 
and is estimated by solving the following problem: 
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where  k s c ,
￿
is the share of the total catch of species s taken by fleet k, as produced by the model (Eqs.1 and 
2), and  k s c , is the average annual catch share 2001-2005. In this model there are K = 14 fishing fleets: six 
purse seine fleets; five longline fleets; and three contrived fleets. Each of the contrived fleets targets a 
single species (bigeye, yellowfin or skipjack) to account for catches over and above those modelled for 
the 11 other fleets. The latter three fleets are termed ‘Other fleets’ or ‘Others’ in result tables. IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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Taking the age-specific weight , i s w , natural mortality  , i s m , availability  , s k q and selectivity , ,   i s k s  used in 
the WCPOBTM model, we define a reference solution by finding the fleet effort levels  k E  that best 
reproduce the average catch shares taken over the reference period 2001-2005, according to (3). In this 
exercise it is assumed that the recruitment to all three stocks is the same. Thereafter the initial recruitment 
to each stock  , r s x  was set so that the catch produced by the model equalled the average catch 2001- 2005.  
 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
 
For economic analysis, it is necessary to determine the cost per unit of effort for the different fleets. The 
present highly aggregated model is not directly comparable to the much more detailed WCPOBTM model 
so cost parameters from that model cannot be used directly. As a base reference case we set the cost per 
unit of effort so as to produce rents equal to 10 percent of revenue for all fleets in the reference solution, 
the cost per unit of effort being constant. The WCPOBTM model produces rents from nil to over 30 
percent  of  revenues,  varying  across  fleets.  Later  we  will  compare  these  with  the  rents  of  the  fleets 
obtained for a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium solution for seven country groupings of the fleets, to 
gauge whether or not these cost assumptions are realistic. 
 
As to prices, we rely on two alternative assumptions. First, fish prices are assumed to be fixed and 
insensitive to catch volumes and identical to the ones used in the reference solution discussed below. 
These prices are based on the average prices 2001-2004 [1]. For the longline fleets we have used the price 
of fresh tuna. Fresh longline tuna is the most highly priced tuna product and also the most profitable one. 
Using this price for all longline caught tuna will exaggerate the advantage of the longline fleets, partly 
because not all longline caught tuna can be sold fresh, and partly because increased catches of longline 
tuna are likely to lead to lower prices. Longline tuna mainly goes to the Japanese sashimi market, and it 
has been shown that the price declines as more fish is supplied Bertignac et al., [4]. 
 
The sensitivity of prices of various tuna products to changes in supplies from the Forum Fisheries Agency 
Area (which covers Pacific Island Countries and their Exclusive Economic Zones) has been studied by 
Reid et al. [7].We shall investigate how our results are affected by the price changes that would result 
from changed supplies from the West Central Pacific, using price flexibilities reported in Reid et al. [7]. 
 
Maximizing rents 
 
Table 2 compares the solution that maximizes aggregate rents with the reference solution. In the rent-
maximizing exercise, the fishing mortalities applied by fleets other than purse seining and longlining are 
held  constant  at  the  same  level  as  in  the  reference  solution.  They  are  thus  not  a  part  of  the  rent 
maximization. The aggregate rent is the maximum, undiscounted, sustainable rent, as the model is a static 
yield-per-recruit  model  that  compares  different  long  term  equilibrium  solutions,  but  including  the 
dynamics between age groups. With fixed prices, the aggregate rent in the fishery (not shown) more than 
doubles, compared with the reference solution. The purse seine fleets are virtually eliminated while the 
fishing mortality for the longline fleets almost doubles for yellowfin and remains virtually unchanged for 
bigeye. Because the virtual disappearance of the purse seine fleets leaves more fish to be taken by the 
longline fleets the longline catches of yellowfin more than double, and catches of bigeye increase by 
almost 40 percent. The rent grows almost fivefold for the longline fleets. As a percent of revenue, rent is 
between 20 and 30 percent of revenue both for the purse seine and the longline fleets. 
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Table 1. Comparison of Rent-Maximizing and Reference Solutions. Catch is in thousand tonnes and 
rent in million US$. Numbers in parentheses refer to the case with volume-dependent prices. 
 
Species    Purse seine    Longline 
    Reference  Rent max        Reference  Rent max     
    f    Change 
(%)    f    Change 
(%) 
Bigeye    0.06081  0.00028 
(0.00569)    -99.5 
(-90.6)    0.01627  0.01715 
(0.01141)    5.4 
(-29.8) 
Yellowfin    0.02478  0.00042 
(0.00840)    -98.3 
-(66.1)    0.00461  0.00877 
(0.00484)    90.3 
(5.1) 
Skipjack    0.03138  0.00072 
(0.01442)    -97.7 
(-54.1)    0  0     
    Catch    Change 
(%)    Catch    Change 
(%) 
Bigeye    29.0  0.2 
(3.9)    -99.4 
(-86.6)    87.7  119.8 
(88.6)    36.6 
(1.0) 
Yellowfin    199.8  4.0 
(80.1)    -98.0 
(-59.9)    88.9  203.3 
(112.0)    128.7 
(26.0) 
Skipjack    1251.7  33.4 
(626.6)    -97.3 
(-49.9)    0  0     
    Rent    Change 
(%)    Rent    Change 
(%) 
All    123.0  7.7 
(260.0)    -94.1 
(111.4)    114.7  562.5 
(382.6)    390.3 
(233.5) 
    Rent as % of revenue        Rent as % of revenue     
All    10  23.0 
(35.3)        10  27.0 
(30.0)     
    Fleets active        Fleets active     
    All  Taiwan        All  Taiwan, Others     
 
 
Taking price sensitivity into account gives radically different results. As stated above, we have relied on 
the results in Reid et al. [7]. They calculated the price flexibilities for tuna products from the West Central 
Pacific, taking into account the elasticity of demand in different markets and the share of tuna from this 
area in these markets. They found a price flexibility equal to -0.1 for fresh and frozen tuna, which would 
apply to the longline fleet in our case, and -0.5 for light meat canned tuna, for which the purse seine fleet 
supplies raw material. Applying these price flexibilities produces the results shown in parentheses in 
Table 1. We see that the effort (fishing mortality produced) by the purse seine fleet is reduced by much 
less in this case. The catches of yellowfin and skipjack by the purse seine fleets are roughly halved while 
the catches of the longline fleet increase only moderately. These results are similar to those obtained by 
Bertignac et al. [4] and Kompas and Che [5] who took price sensitivity to catch volumes into account. 
 
Solutions to the rent maximisation problems posed above would satisfy the requirements of the WCPFC 
in being sustainable and according with optimum utilisation (perhaps best interpreted as ‘economically 
efficient’), to the extent that all fishing countries have an equal right to fish anywhere in the ocean. This is 
not true, for example, if tuna stocks reside in the EEZs of coastal fishing countries for part of the year and 
migrate or straddle between EEZs, or between EEZs and the high seas. Those countries with tuna passing 
through their EEZs can ordinarily determine access conditions to the advantage of EEZs individually or IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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as a group, at the expense of global economic efficiency. In this case rent maximisation for non-spatially 
structured problems can only approximate globally efficient outcomes. However, the UNFSA provisions 
do appear to allow for alternatives to EEZs as a means of meeting the conservation and efficiency goals of  
management of migratory or straddling species. For example, annual quotas could be set for all fishing 
fleets  and  made  transferable  between  fleets;  the  efficient  total  quota  could  be  determined  by  the 
maximisation problems just considered. The applicability of whole-of-region total allowable catches is 
discussed in Chand et al. [8], Petersen [9] and Kennedy [3]. 
 
For other possibly more realistic coalition behaviour as an alternative to rent maximisation behaviour, we 
need to consider the likely players and their coalitions. The decisions on harvesting effort are made by 
fleets. As fleet effort is dispersed in fixed proportions across the age categories of the three tuna species 
and no country has exclusive property rights in any of the species, players are likely to be fleet-based.  
 
This results in the following possibilities for coalitions of fleet players: (1) single member fleet coalitions; 
(2) a coalition of the fleet players by fleet type - purse seiner or long liner; (3) coalitions of purse seine 
fleets by country, and coalitions of long line fleets by country; and (4) coalitions of all fleets by country. 
The type (1) coalition setup results in the rent maximisation discussed in this section if all single member 
fleet coalitions act cooperatively. 
 
Whilst opportunities exist for deals to be done between the same fleet types of different countries, it is 
plausible  that  coalitions  of  fleets  will  be  country  based,  recognising  the  advantages  of  possible 
government support if needed. Consequently the type (4) coalition setup is adopted here. Thus seven 
country players are defined as coalitions of the fleet players of the country (or a group of countries,  PICs, 
“Others”). Four country players have both a purse seine fleet and a longline fleet (Japan, Korea, Taiwan, 
and “Others”) while the remaining three country players have only a purse seine fleet (US, China and 
PICs). We now consider two possible types of strategic coalitions of country players.  
 
Nash equilibrium 1: One country player against all other country players 
 
Solutions like the rent-maximizing solution above are none too likely to be attained. They imply that the 
most efficient fleets should do the fishing and the others disappear, with the latter being compensated by a 
share in the greater profit. Such grand coalitions are sometimes not viable even in principle, as there may 
be incentives for some members of the coalition to break out and form their own sub-coalition, either with 
themselves as a single member or with more, but not all, members. See Kennedy [10] for consideration of 
solution concepts, with and without side-payments, and allocations to indicate the security of coalitions. 
 
The rents accruing to the h-th player breaking out and those who remain in the coalition are given by the 
following Nash equilibrium, consistent with the solution to the following problem: 
 
{ }
{ }
* *
* *
argmax  
argmax  
h
g
h h g h
E
g h g
E E
E
π =
=
E
E
E E π π π π
                 (4) 
 where  h π is the rent generated by defecting country h setting effort level at h E ,  g E  is the set of effort 
levels   g E g h ∀ ≠ , and  { } i π π π π is the resulting rent generated for the coalition of remaining players. 
 
This is one thing that could threaten the grand coalition implied by the rent-maximizing solution. Suppose 
each country would have to be offered an outcome at least as good as the country could obtain if it 
decided to break out of the coalition and maximize its own rent. Table 2 shows the rent that would result IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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if one country acts independently and the rest act as a coalition, as well as the maximum rent (the grand 
coalition), which is (see Table 1) $570.2 million in the fixed price case and $642.6 with price flexibilities 
as discussed above. It is noteworthy that the rent obtained by a single member who breaks out of the 
grand coalition, summed across all possible single members, is more than twice that of the maximum rent. 
It would thus not be possible to offer all members of the grand coalition a share in the total rent which 
exceeds what each could obtain if he decides to leave the coalition and the rest remain in the coalition. 
This makes it doubtful whether the grand coalition would be stable. While the remaining coalition could 
buy off one member who defects (third column in Table 2), it would not be possible to deter all members 
simultaneously from leaving the coalition by offering each what he would get if he went alone. 
 
Table 2. Rent obtained by one Defecting Country Player, Rent for Coalition of Remaining Country 
Players, and Coalition Rent for Dissuading Defection.  Million US$. Numbers in parentheses refer 
to volume-dependent prices.  
 
There are conditions under which the grand coalition would be stable. This occurs, for example, if all 
countries realize that if one of them breaks out, all the others would do likewise. What then is important 
to look at is the temporary gain one country might obtain from breaking out of the coalition less the 
present value of the discounted loss resulting from everyone else going for the Nash equilibrium solution. 
The outcome of this depends on the discount rate and would require an intertemporal model to analyse 
fully [11].  
    NE Single 
country 
(Defector) 
rent 
  NE Total rent 
for coalition 
of  remaining 
countries 
  Maximum payment 
coalition could make 
to dissuade  defection, 
given the maximum 
cooperative joint rent 
is 570.2(642.6) 
  NE rent for 
each country 
competing 
against all 
other 
countries 
                 
Japan    197.3 
(252.8) 
  238.3 
(280.0) 
  331.4 
(362.7) 
  20.8 
(44.3) 
                 
Korea    230.0 
(265.3) 
  221.1 
(283.8) 
  348.6 
(358.9) 
  26.7 
(43.5) 
                 
Taiwan    259.4 
(276.8) 
  222.5 
(273.8) 
  347.2 
(368.9) 
  25.7 
(52.5) 
                 
PICs    128.7 
(159.4) 
  294.1 
(408.9) 
  275.6 
(233.8) 
  24.8 
(34.3) 
                 
China    180.2 
(164.5) 
  313.5 
(425.2) 
  256.3 
(217.5) 
  12.9 
(22.1) 
                 
US    126.2 
(162.2) 
  155.9 
(323.7) 
  413.9 
(319.0) 
  22.3 
(33.4) 
                 
Others    223.5 
(193.5) 
  272.0 
(315.9) 
  297.8 
(326.8) 
  21.3 
(32.9) 
                 
Total    1345.2 
(1474.5) 
 
 
      154.5 
(263.0) IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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Nash equilibrium 2: Each country player against all other country players 
 
Given that a grand coalition is unlikely, it makes sense to look at a solution where everyone is competing 
against  everyone  else.  This  type  of  outcome  can  be  expected  to  prevail  in  the  present,  virtually 
unregulated, situation. 
 
For the Nash equilibrium, the following set of solutions to all one-member coalition problems holds: 
 
 
* *
* *
argmax { | }
   
where   the set of      .
h
h h h g
E
g g
E E
h
E g h
π =
∀
= ∀ ≠
E
E
  (5) 
 
The last column of Table 2 shows the rents prevailing in this Nash equilibrium, for the case of volume-
independent prices. These are only 27 and 40 percent, respectively, of the maximum rent with fixed prices 
and volume-dependent prices, so if the players reckon that this situation would prevail in the absence of 
cooperation, and if side payments are possible, the grand coalition could indeed be stable. A country that 
breaks out of the coalition would only make a temporary gain. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has shown that considerable increase in rent can be obtained from changing the tuna fishery 
from  its  present  configuration.  Two  changes  are  involved.  First,  purse  seining  should  be  reduced 
drastically. If prices are not sensitive to catch volumes the purse seine fleets would almost be eliminated 
and the benefits would be realized by the longline fleets, which deliver a more valuable product. If prices 
are sensitive to catch volume, reduced catches by the purse seine fleets would generate some benefits for 
them in the form of higher prices, while the benefits for the longline fleets due to more fish being 
available there would be limited by the volume sensitivity of prices for sashimi-grade products. The 
parameters we have used in fact indicate a higher price flexibility for the purse seine catches, so that a 
reduction in catches results in much higher prices and improved profitability. 
 
Second, provided there is a mechanism to share the aggregate rent, the fishing should be carried out by 
countries with the most cost-effective fleets. This means that some fleets would disappear altogether, with 
the nations involved getting a share of the total rent. There are obvious practical and political obstacles to 
such a solution; how long would a country without any fishing fleet of its own be considered entitled to a 
share in the rents from fishing by others hundreds of miles away from its economic zone? Apart from 
that, in this particular setting this kind of solution would probably not be stable; it is unlikely that all 
countries can be offered rent shares that exceed what they could get on their own if one breaks out of the 
coalition and the others stay in it. Only if they realize that a breakdown of the coalition would end in 
everybody competing against everyone else and that the gains from breaking away would be temporary 
could the grand coalition be viable. 
 
The biggest obstacle to achieving the cooperative solution is perhaps the fact that this would reduce the 
purse seine effort drastically. Some of the nations engaged in purse seining are not involved in longlining, 
or do so only to a limited extent, and would lose heavily from reducing their activity, unless a way could 
be found to give them a share in the benefits accruing to the longline fleets. For the Pacific islands 
countries this could come in the form of higher access fees for distant water longliners, but for those 
distant water nations with purse seiners only (US and China), some other mechanism would have to be 
found. 
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ENDNOTE 
*An extended version of this paper will appear in a forthcoming issue of the Journal of Natural 
Resources Policy Research. 
 